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Comparison of Multi-agent and Single-agent Inverse
Learning on a Simulated Soccer Example
Xiaomin Lin 1 and Peter A. Beling 2 and Randy Cogill3
Abstract. We compare the performance of Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) with the relative new model of Multi-agent Inverse
Reinforcement Learning (MIRL). Before comparing the methods, we
extend a published Bayesian IRL approach that is only applicable to
the case where the reward is only state dependent to a general one ca-
pable of tackling the case where the reward depends on both state and
action. Comparison between IRL and MIRL is made in the context
of an abstract soccer game, using both a game model in which the re-
ward depends only on state and one in which it depends on both state
and action. Results suggest that the IRL approach performs much
worse than the MIRL approach. We speculate that the underperfor-
mance of IRL is because it fails to capture equilibrium information
in the manner possible in MIRL.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (MRL) problem was first
proposed by proposed by Littman [8] to address the limiting as-
sumption in Reinforcement Learning (RL) that potentially respon-
sive agents in a system area part of a passive environment. In a RL
model, an agent can fully control the state transition process by tak-
ing actions on its own (though some stochastic variation is allowed);
in a MRL problem, by contrast, the state transition process is deter-
mined by joint actions of all interacting rational agents. This essential
difference complicates the MRL problems. As pointed out by Hu and
Wellman [3], the concept of optimality, which is explicitly defined in
IRL problems, loses its meaning in MRL problems since any agent’s
payoff depends on others’ choices of action. In the absence of op-
timality, one can adopt as a solution concept the Nash equilibrium,
in which each agent’s choice is the best response to other agents’
choices [3]. In fact, so far there is no agreement on a solution con-
cept for a general MRL problem.
The first attempt to solve a MRL problem, given by Littman [8],
made use of a Markov or stochastic game [11], which is an extension
of game theory to Markov Decision Process (MDP)-like environ-
ments. However, only the special case of two-player zero-sum games,
in which one agent’s gain is always the other’s loss, is considered in
[8]. Hu and Wellman [3] extended Littman’s work, proposing a two-
player general-sum stochastic game framework for the MRL prob-
lem. Later MRL work has focused on the development of solution
concepts and methods. For example, in [1] a weak condition where
an agent can neither observe other agents’ actions or rewards, nor
knows the underlying game or the corresponding Nash equilibrium a
priori is considered and a new MRL algorithm called the Weighted
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Policy Learner (WPL) is proposed. Multi-agent learning in complex
large distributed systems is also touched in [4], where it is noted
that, although sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms gener-
ally do not scale, it is possible to find restricted classes of games
where simple efficient algorithms converge. Solution concepts for
distributed, multi-agent planning problems that involve coordination
games under weak information exchange models have been consid-
ered in [12, 16].
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), as the inverse learning
problem for RL, has been studied extensively [10, 13, 6, 5, 14]. IRL
aims to recover the reward function of the agent, in order to reason
its behavior that is observed. Similarly, the inverse learning problems
for MRL, termed MIRL, includes the problem of estimating the game
payoffs being played, given only observations of the actions taken
by the players. The reward function of an agent of interest recovered
from an IRL approach, is in fact the mathematical expectation of all
reward functions of other adaptive agents, which can be recovered
from a MIRL approach. For example, if there are n adaptive agents
in the environment and the one of interest is the kth of them, its re-
ward at state s is
r
k
(
s, a
k
)
=
∫∫
Ak
r
(
s,A
k
)
P
(
A
k|s
)
dA
k
,
where
A
k = a1 · · · ak−1ak+1 · · · an
P
(
A
k|s
)
= p
(
a
1|s
)
· · · p
(
a
k−1|s
)
p
(
a
k+1|s
)
· · · p (an|s) .
The above equation is valid in a general situation where the action
space is continuous.
There exist several solution approaches for MIRL. Natarajan [9]
presents an inverse reinforcement learning approach for multiple
agents. However, that approach neither deals with competing agents
nor considers a game-theoretic model. In [15], a form of the inverse
equilibrium problem is discussed. However, that paper considers si-
multaneous one-stage games, rather than the sequential stochastic
games. We have recently developed a Bayesian formulation for two-
person zero-sum MIRL problems, in which an abstract soccer game,
as a numerical example, is solved [2, 7].
Recall that MRL was proposed because the state transition dynam-
ics remains unknown if other adaptive agent’s actions are not taken
into account, so that IRL is difficult to implement. However, in the
two-person zero-sum MIRL model presented in [2], it is assumed
that the two agents’ polices of actions over all states, are known or
observed. Therefore, a complete state transition matrix can be ob-
tained. Then a question is naturally raised: is a MDP-based IRL ap-
proach able to solve the rewards recovery problem in a multi-agent
environment? This question is worth investigating deeply because
if the answer is yes, there is no meaning to put addition effort into
MIRL research.
The primary contribution of this work is to answer the above ques-
tion. We first extend a Bayesian IRL approach, the idea of which
was original proposed in [13], to infer the unknown rewards. Then
we apply it on an abstract soccer game example, comparing the re-
sults with those obtained from the MIRL approach introduced in [2].
We consider two cases: one is that the unknown reward is only state
dependent and the other We demonstrate that the results are much
worse than that obtained from the MIRL approach introduced in [2].
This finding gives us an in-depth understanding the fundamentals of
MIRL and substantiate the value of research on this topic.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives
notation and concepts preliminary to MIRL, which is developed in
the two-person zero-sum case in Section 3. Section 4 extends the
Bayesian IRL approach proposed in [13] to a general form. Section 5
presents the soccer example and experiments in which the two meth-
ods are used to recover rewards. Section 6 provides an evaluation of
the quality of the learned rewards in terms of game playing success in
simulations of the soccer game. Finally, Section 7 offers concluding
remarks.
2 PRELIMINARIES
A finite state two-person discounted stochastic game can be specified
in terms of the state space S = {1, 2, · · · , N}, the action spaces
A1 = A2 = {1, 2, · · · ,M}, reward functions rk : S×A1×A2 7→
R for each player k ∈ {1, 2}, transition probabilities p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
,
and a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1).
In the MIRL model presented in [2], there are several rules gov-
erning the games played between two agents: First, each player has
perfect knowledge of the other’s rewards. Second, each player acts
simultaneously in any state transition process and receives a reward
depending on the starting state and their immediate actions. Third,
they repeat the game over an infinite time horizon, aiming to ac-
cumulate maximum discounted rewards. In addition, all single-state
games are zero-sum, which is, more specifically, r1
(
s, a1, a2
)
=
−r2
(
s, a1, a2
)
. Due to the symmetry in rewards between the two
players, we can simply use r to denote r1. Also, it is assumed that
the bipolicy pi of the two competing agents, which is a collection of
both agents’ policies of actions over all states, denoted
(
pi1, pi2
)
, is
known.
The bipolicy-dependent, discounted expected sum of rewards of
player 1 as a function of the initial state, which is known as the value
function, can be formulated as:
Vpi (s) =
∞∑
t=0
γ
t
E (r˜pi (st) |s0 = s) , (1)
where st denotes the state of the game at stage t. r˜pi (st) is the single-
stage expected reward earned by player 1 at state s under bipolicy pi,
specifically,
r˜pi (s) =
∑
a1,a2
pi
1
(
s, a
1
)
pi
2
(
s, a
2
)
r
(
s, a
1
, a
2
)
=
[
pi
1 (s)
]T
r (s) pi2 (s) .
(2)
Let r be the rewards vector of player 1, whose length is M2N . r˜pi
can be expressed as
r˜pi = Bpir. (3)
More details about Bpi can be found in [7].
The state transition probability matrix under bipolicy pi, Gpi , is a
N ×N matrix with elements specified as
gpi
(
s
′|s
)
=
∑
a1,a2
pi
1
(
s, a
1
)
pi
2
(
s, a
2
)
p
(
s
′|s, a1, a2
)
. (4)
A significant concept in two-person zero-sum MIRL is minimax
bipolicy in which each player minimizes his own maximum loss.
This is an equilibrium in that it has the property that neither player
can change the game value in their favor given that the other player
holds their policy fixed. In a two-person zero-sum stochastic game,
we say that the two agents reach a minimax bipolicy if both of them
employ a minimax strategy in every single-stage game.
3 BAYESIAN MIRL
In [2], the authors point out that the core of two-person zero-sum
MIRL is the assumption that two agents reach a minimax bipolicy be-
cause both of them are rational. Using all terminologies and notations
introduced in the preceding section, a convex quadratic program, in
a Bayesian optimization setting, can be proposed for a general two-
person zero-sum MIRL problem
minimize: 1
2
(r − µr)
T Σr
−1 (r − µr)
subject to: (Bpi2|a1=i −Bpi)Dpir ≤ 0(
Bpi1|a2=j −Bpi
)
Dpir ≥ 0
(5)
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2, where µr is the mean of r and Σr is its co-
variance matrix. In the constraints of (5), Bpik|a(3−k)=i (k = 1, 2) is
conceptually similar to Bpi , except that Bpi(3−k)|ak=l is constructed
from a bipolicy in which player k always takes action l in any state
while the other player still follows its original policy pi(3−k). In ad-
dition, Dpi can be expanded as
Dpi =
(
I + γP (I − γGpi)
−1
Bpi
)
, (6)
where P is a NM2×N matrix with p
(
s′|s, a1, a2
)
as its elements.
When it is known that r is only a function of state, we can use a
simper version of (5), as follows
minimize: 1
2
(r − µr)
T Σ−1r (r − µr)
subject to: (Gpi −Gpi2|a1=i) (I − γGpi)−1 r ≥ 0(
Gpi −Gpi1|a2=j
)
(I − γGpi)
−1
r ≤ 0
(7)
for all i ∈ A1 and j ∈ A2, where Gpi(3−k)|ak=l (k = 1, 2) has
a similar definition to that of Gpi , except that Gpi(3−k)|ak=l is such
a N × N state transition matrix that player k always takes action
l in any state while the other player still follows its original policy
pi(3−k), the elements of which are, more specifically,
gpi(3−k)|ak=l =
∑
a(3−k)
pi
k (s, l) pi(3−k)
(
s, a
(3−k)
)
p
(
s
′|s, l, a(3−k)
)
.
(8)
The theoretical validation of (5) and (7) are detailed in [2, 7].
4 BAYESIAN IRL
We will address the multi-agent inverse problem from the perspective
of IRL. Qiao and Beling [13] propose a Bayesian optimization pro-
gram based on the assumption that the agent’s reward function is only
state dependent. In this section, we will extend this idea and formu-
late a more general program where the case that reward is state and
action dependent is considered. Although we now turn to the MDP
framework, most of the terminologies and notations introduced in
Section 2 will still be adopted here, unless otherwise specified.
As stated before, we will focus on player 1’s rewards. However, we
are now tasked to recover rpi2
(
s, a1
)
, which is the expected value of
r
(
s, a1, pi2 (s)
)
in case player 2 employs policy pi2, specifically,
rpi2
(
s, a
1) =∑
a2
r
(
s, a
1
, a
2)
pi
2 (
s, a
2)
. (9)
For simplicity, we will just use r to denote the column vector
whose element is rpi2
(
s, a1
)
, as follows:
rpi2 = ( rpi2
(
s1, a
1
1
)
, rpi2
(
s2, a
1
1
)
, · · · , rpi2
(
sN , a
1
1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
a11
, · · · ,
r
(
s1, a
1
M
)
, rpi2
(
s2, a
1
M
)
, · · · , rpi2
(
sN , a
1
M
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
a1
M
)T .
Note that the length of r here is MN , which is different from the one
defined in Sections 2 and 3.
We define player 1’s Q-function of state s and action a1 under
policy pi1, Qpi1
(
s, a1
)
, to be the expected return from state s, taking
action a1 and thereafter following its original policy.
Qpi1
(
s, a
1) = rpi2 (s, a1)+ γ∑
s′
p
(
s
′|s, a1
)
Vpi1
(
s
′)
, (10)
and its value function in state s is
Vpi1 (s) =
∑
a1
Qpi1
(
s, a
1)
pi
1 (
s, a
1)
= r˜pi1 (s) + γ
∑
s′
gpi
(
s
′|s
)
Vpi1
(
s
′
)
,
(11)
where
r˜pi1 (s) =
∑
a1
rpi2
(
s, a
1
)
pi
1
(
s, a
1
)
. (12)
Hence (11) can be written in matrix notation as
Vpi1 = r˜pi1 + γGpiVpi1 , (13)
where
r˜pi1 = Cpi1r, (14)
and Cpi1 is a N ×NM matrix constructed from pi1, whose ith row
is,
0, · · · , 0, pi1 (i, 1) , 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, · · ·︸︷︷︸
(M−2)N
, 0, · · · , 0, pi1 (i,M) , 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N

 .
Thus
Vpi1 = (I − γGpi)
−1
Cpi1r. (15)
The policy pi1 is optimal for player 1 in the sense that
Vpi1
(
s, pi
1 (s)
)
> Qpi1 (s, i) , (16)
for all i ∈ A1 and s ∈ S , which means that in every state s, it
is better (or equivalent) for player 1 to employ strategy pi1 (s) than
following any pure strategy. (16) can be expended as
r˜pi1 (s) + γ
∑
s′
Pspi1(s)
(
s
′|s
)
Vpi1
(
s
′
)
> r (s, i) + γ
∑
s′
Psa1=i
(
s
′|s
)
Vpi1
(
s
′
)
,∀i ∈ A1.
(17)
In (17), note that Pspi1(s) (s′|s) = gpi (s′|s) and Psa1=i (s′|s) =
gpi2|a1=i (s
′|s). Expressing the above equation in matrix notation
gives
r˜pi1 + γGpiVpi1 > ra1=i + γGpi2|a1=iVpi1 (18)
where ra1=i = Ca1=ir and Ca1=i can be constructed from a pure
policy where player 1 will take action i in any state. Substituting (15)
and (14) into (18), gives(
F
pi1
a1=i − Ca1=i
)
r > 0, (19)
where
F
pi1
a1=i =
[
γ
(
Gpi −Gpi2|a1=i
)
(I − γGpi)
−1 + I
]
Cpi1 , (20)
for all i ∈ A1.
To establish a Bayesian setting for IRL, we need to assign a prior
distribution on the reward vector of player 1, f (r). Let p
(
pi1|r
)
de-
note the likelihood of observing player 1’s policy pi1 when its true
reward is r. We model p
(
pi1|r
)
by
p
(
pi
1|r
)
=
{
1, if Qpi1
(
s, pi1 (s)
)
> Qpi1 (s, i) ,∀i ∈ A1
0, otherwise.
(21)
The posterior distribution of the unknown rewards for a given ob-
served policy pi1 is now
f
(
r|pi1
)
∝ p
(
pi
1|r
)
f (r) ,
Hence
p
(
pi
1|r
)
∝
{
f (r) , if Qpi1
(
s, pi1 (s)
)
> Qpi1 (s, i) ,∀i ∈ A1
0, otherwise.
By assuming that r is Gaussian distributed, r ∼ N (µr,Σr), we
can develop a standard optimization program with the posterior of r
being the objective function and (19) being the constraint. Specifi-
cally,
minimize: 1
2
(r − µr)
T Σr
−1 (r − µr)
subject to:
(
F
pi1
a1=i −Ca1=i
)
r > 0,
(22)
for all i ∈ A1. In the above formulation, µr is the mean of the un-
known reward vector as a prior, and Σr is its covariance matrix.
5 NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will apply the Bayesian IRL to the abstract soc-
cer game introduced in [2, 7], and compare the results with those
obtained from MIRL.
The game is played on a 4 × 5 grid as depicted in Figure 1. We
use A and B to denote two players, and the circle in the figures to
represent the ball. Each player can either stay unmoved or move to
one of its neighborhood squares by taking one of 5 actions in each
turn: N (north), S (south), E (east), W (west), and stand. Each player
can only take one action in a single time period, and both of them act
simultaneously. If both players land on the same square in the same
time period, the ball is exchanged between the two players with prob-
ability β = 0.6, which is known to the observer. There are in total
800 states in this model, corresponding to the positions of the play-
ers and ball possession. Each player aims to maximize its expected
points scored, subject to a discount factor of γ = 0.9.
Both players attempt to dribble the ball into specific squares rep-
resenting their opponent’s goal. Player A attempts to score by reach-
ing squares 6 or 11 with the ball, and player B attempts to score by
reaching squares 10 or 15. Once a point is scored, the players take
the positions shown in Figure 1 and ball possession is assigned ran-
domly.
Obviously, the two rational players are playing a zero-sum
stochastic game. As stated in Section 3, the bipolicy that they follow
is a minimax bipolicy, and is known in this example. We are tasked to
recover the reward structure of A, and thereafter infer which squares
A must reach in order to score a point (the goal squares).
Figure 1. Soccer game: initial board
5.1 State Dependent Rewards
In the above game model, the reward is only state dependent. We will
apply MIRL and IRL methods to recover A’s rewards.
We use a Gaussian prior, where the mean reward assigns 0.8 point
to player A in every state where A has possession of the ball and -0.8
point in every state where player B has possession of the ball. The
covariance matrix of the prior is assumed to be an identity matrix,
because without the knowledge of point structure, the correlation be-
tween different reward is not clear.
Results from these experiments are shown in Figure 2. In the fig-
ure, red circles represent the true reward, green triangles represent
rewards learned from IRL, and blue stars represent rewards learned
from MIRL. Examination of the figure shows a qualitative advantage
for MIRL in that, in aggregate, the blue stars lie substantially closer
to the red circles than do the green triangles. In Section 6 we assess
the quality of learned rewards in terms of the quality of the forward
policy that can be learned from them.
5.2 State and Actions Dependent Rewards
We now complicate the soccer game by allowing a “shoot” action.
In addition to the available 5 actions, each player who has the ball
can take a shot toward their opponent’s goal at any position, with
a probability of succesful shot (PSS) distribution over all positions
in the field shown in Table 1. Assume that each one’s PSS is inde-
pendent of its opponent’s position. One major difference from the
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Figure 2. State-dependent rewards recovery results
simple model is that now the reward to be covered depends on both
state and actions. Recall that IRL is used to infer r
(
s, a1
)
and MIRL
will infer r
(
s, a1, a2
)
. We can compare the two results by calculate
r
(
s, a1
)
from (9) in section 4. In both of the methods, we need to
PSS = 1 PSS = 0.7 PSS = 0.5
A 6, 11 1, 7, 12, 16 2, 8, 13, 17
B 10, 15 5, 9, 14, 20 4, 8, 13, 19
PSS = 0.3 PSS = 0.1 PSS = 0
A 3, 9, 14, 18 4, 10, 15, 19 5, 20
B 3, 7, 12, 18 2, 6, 11, 17 1, 16
Table 1. Original PSS distribution of each player
assign a mean and a covariance matrix for the prior. We can also de-
velop three types of means based off of our knowledge of this game,
as the following:
• Weak Mean: the same as the one described in section 5.1;
• Median Mean: guessing that A’s goal might be among the right-
most squares, or squares 5, 10, 15 and 20, and symmetrically, B’s
goal might be among the leftmost squares, or squares 1, 6, 11 and
16, we assign 1 point to A whenever A has the ball and is in the
four leftmost squares, and −1 point to A whenever B has the ball
and is in four rightmost squares. Also, when A has the ball and
takes a shot, no matter where she is, we assign 0.5 point to A.
Otherwise, no points will be assigned to A.
• Strong Mean: we have a good guess of A’s point distribution, ex-
cept for its PSS distributions. So comparing to median mean, the
only difference is that now the potential goal area includes only 2
squares (square 6 and 11 for A and square 10 and 15 for B), rather
than 4 squares, for both players.
The covariance matrix of the reward vector encodes our belief of
the structure of the prior. We can come up with a covariance matrix
encapsulating some internal information subject to our knowledge of
the relationship between rewards,
1. When A has the ball and takes a shot, the PSS depends only on A’
s position in the field.
2. In any state when A has the ball, the reward for A for any non-
shoot action is a state-dependent constant.
We name this covariance matrix Strong Covariance Matrix, in order
to distinguish it from the simple identity matrix we used in the simple
game model.
Figures 3-5 show, for the various experiments, original rewards
(red circles), rewards learned from IRL (green triangles), and re-
wards learned from MIRL (blue stars). It can be seen that in each
figure there is a considerable overlap in distribution between the true
rewards and MIRL rewards. The recovered rewards from IRL, by
contrast, tend to lie far away from the true rewards.
We also check the recovery of A’s PSS, present results in Figure
6-8. All these results show that compared to the MIRL approach, the
IRL method is unable to give a reasonable recovery of A’s PSS.
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Figure 3. MIRL vs IRL on rewards: weak mean and strong covariance
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Figure 4. MIRL vs IRL on rewards: median mean and strong covariance
6 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION USING
RECOVERED REWARDS
In this section, we measure the quality of learned rewards in terms
of the quality of the forward solution that they induce. Let A employ
the IRL rewards and B employ the MIRL rewards, and both believe
that their own reward function is the true one. Being rational, both of
them will employ a minimax bipolicy based off of their own rewards.
Another criteria to evaluate the rewards quality is to apply them in a
different environmental setting, e.g. β = 1. We will simulate games
between A and B when β = 0.6 and β = 1, and compare the win-
lose results of cases where different sets of rewards are employed.
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Figure 5. MIRL vs IRL on rewards: strong mean and strong covariance
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Figure 6. MIRL vs IRL on PSS: weak mean and strong covariance
The simulation results are presented in Table 2. In this table, the
first column is the type of rewards that A and B employ to develop
their minimax policies. A comparison only occurs when the two
players use the same type of rewards on their own. WM, MM, SM
and SC stand for weak mean, median mean, strong mean, and strong
covariance matrix, respectively. The rest columns are the simulation
results of 5000 rounds of games between A and B in cases where β
being 0, 0.6 and 1. For a more clear comparison, we only count those
game episodes ending in win-lose outcomes. Each column gives the
winning percentage of B in each different rewards set they use. Our
description of the game model indicates that A and B are supposed
to be equal in match. However, this simulation results shows that B
gets a big edge on A. the We can conclude from that rewards learned
from MIRL beat those learned from IRL in quality.
% won (β = 0) % won (β = 0.6) % won (β = 1)
WM & SC 100 100 100
MM & SC 77.13 63.23 62.30
SM & SC 100 100 100
Table 2. A vs B games simulation results
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Position
PS
S 
of
 A
 
 
Original PSS
PSS from MIRL
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Position
PS
S 
of
 A
 
 
Original PSS
PSS from IRL
Figure 7. MIRL vs IRL on PSS: median mean and strong covariance
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Figure 8. MIRL vs IRL on PSS: strong mean and strong covariance
7 CONCLUSION
The experimental results presented in this paper suggest that the
MIRL problem is worth additional study because learned MIRL re-
wards tend to substantially closer to true rewards and to yield better
forward policies than those learned from IRL. Several factors may
underlie the performance of MIRL. First, a multi-agent system often
involves games while IRL assumes the other agents in the environ-
ment are passive. Second, from the perspective of game theory, op-
timal strategies are generally mixed, and these in turn are difficult to
handle in IRL. Lastly, IRL cannot fully capture equilibrium informa-
tion, though some equilibrium information can been reflected in the
state transition dynamics.
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